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One of my earliest memories is sitting on my grandfather’s shoulders, waving a 
flag as our astronauts returned to Hawaii. . . Someday, I hope to hoist my own 
grandchildren onto my shoulders. We’ll still look to the stars in wonder, as 
humans have since the beginning of time. But instead of eagerly awaiting the 
return of our intrepid explorers, we’ll know that because of the choices we make 
now, they’ve gone to space not just to visit, but to stay—and in doing so, to make 
our lives better here on Earth.1 
— Barack Obama 
In the past few years, the world has entered a new era: Space Race II. 
This time, the world is reaching beyond the moon to Mars. NASA, the 
National Aeronautics and Space Association, is aiming to reach the red planet 
before the year 2030.2 The China National Space Administration is aiming 
to reach it nearly a decade earlier, in 2021.3 But nation states are not the only 
ones racing for space. Elon Musk, who is the founder of Tesla, created 
                                                                                                                           
 
* Hannah Svonavec is a third-year law student at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law. 
1 Barack Obama: America will take the giant leap to Mars, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/11/ 
opinions/america-will-take-giant-leap-to-mars-barack-obama/index.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2016). 
2 Rod McPhee, The Race to Mars Is On, MIRROR (Nov. 11, 2016, 10:04 AM), http://www.mirror.co 
.uk/science/race-mars-how-what-would-9237308. 
3 Id. 
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“SpaceX” in 2002.4 SpaceX is a private company with the “ultimate goal of 
enabling people to live on other planets.”5 Musk’s company is similar to 
Virgin Galactic, “the world’s first commercial spaceline.”6 
These advancements, though seemingly science fiction, are our current 
reality. However, with such drastic developments in technology over a short 
period of time, the law has fallen behind. This Note begins with an overview 
of current international space law by examining each of the treaties that 
govern the use of outer space. Part III briefly introduces the criticisms of 
contemporary space law. Part IV explains some of the proposed methods to 
amend international space law. Part V focuses on the background and general 
authority and role of the United Nations as an international governing body. 
Part VI questions the capability and authority of the United Nations to govern 
space exploration and development in the modern day. Finally, Part VII 
contemplates the traits that an “ideal” outer space governing body might 
possess in order to maximize the equitable use of outer space and 
technological advancement. 
II. AN OUTLINE OF CONTEMPORARY SPACE LAW 
Five treaties (hereinafter the Treaties), promulgated by the United 
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (hereinafter 
COPUOS) between 1967 and 1979, constitute modern space law: The Treaty 
on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (hereinafter 
Outer Space Treaty); the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts; the Return 
of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space 
(hereinafter Rescue Agreement); the Convention on International Liability 
for Damage Caused by Space Objects (hereinafter Liability Convention); the 
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space 
(hereinafter Registration Agreement); and the Agreement Governing the 
Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (hereinafter 
                                                                                                                           
 
4 SPACEX, http://www.spacex.com/about (last visited Mar. 10, 2017). 
5 Id. 
6 Who We Are, VIRGIN GALACTIC, http://www.virgingalactic.com/who-we-are/ (last visited 
Mar. 10, 2017). 
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Moon Agreement).7 The Treaties are accompanied by five sets of principles8 
on space law: The Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities 
of States in the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space; The Principles 
Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International 
Direct Television Broadcasting; The Principles Relating to Remote Sensing 
of the Earth from Outer Space; The Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear 
Power Sources in Outer Space; and The Declaration on International 
Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and 
in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of 
Developing Countries.9 
Underlying these bodies of law is the doctrine of the common heritage 
of mankind:10 “[t]he exploration and use of outer space, including the moon 
and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the 
interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific 
development, and shall be the province of all mankind.”11 In other words, the 
use of space is for the benefit and enjoyment of all persons of the world 
regardless of their ability to study or access it. 
Each treaty became more nuanced in addressing the complications and 
risks that accompany an exit of Earth’s atmosphere by expanding upon the 
ideas set forth in the earlier treaties. 
A. The Outer Space Treaty 
The Outer Space Treaty was the first of a series of laws established by 
the United Nations for the governance of space. Signed by 89 states, this 
                                                                                                                           
 
7 John Adolph, The Recent Boom in Private Space Development and the Necessity of an 
International Framework Embracing Private Property Rights to Encourage Investment, 40 INT’L LAW. 
961, 962–63 (2006). 
8 Did You Know?, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, http://www.unoosa.org/ 
oosa/en/informationfor/faqs.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2017) (“The five sets of principles have the legal 
status of General Assembly resolutions. They provide generally accepted principles, rules and standards 
by which States may, and very often do, govern their space related activities.”). 
9 Space Law Treaties and Principles, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, 
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2017). 
10 Adolph, supra note 7, at 964. 
11 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies art. 1, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410 [hereinafter 
Outer Space Treaty]. 
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treaty formed the foundation of all international space law.12 The United 
Nations hypothesized that the Outer Space Treaty would engender “broad 
international co-operation [to] contribute to the development of mutual 
understanding and to the strengthening of friendly relations between States 
and peoples.”13 COPUOS makes clear that space is to be free for the 
exploration and scientific development of all States and “is not subject to 
national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or 
occupation, or by any other means.”14 Based on the language within the Outer 
Space Treaty’s seventeen articles, it is clear that COPUOS did not anticipate 
the commercial development of space.15 
Articles III and IV name space as a neutral zone; they prohibit nuclear 
weapons and weapons of mass destruction from being placed into orbit, 
stating that any use of space is to be for peaceful purposes exclusively.16 
Article V announces that astronauts are “envoys of mankind,” and are to be 
lent assistance by all parties to the Outer Space Treaty should an emergency 
present itself.17 The following three articles, Articles VI, VII, and VIII, 
however, make clear that each sovereign must take responsibility of all 
activities occurring in space, including liability for damages caused to other 
parties of the Treaty.18 Such responsibility applies to State-initiated activities 
as well as non-State-initiated activities (i.e. projects of non-governmental 
entities).19 All objects launched into space by a Treaty signatory must be 
registered with the United Nations by informing the Secretary-General, as 
well as the public and international scientific community, “to the greatest 
extent feasible and practicable, of the nature, conduct, locations and results” 
of their planned exploration.20 The remainder of the Outer Space Treaty sets 
forth the logistical details of the Treaty, including who may join, when, and 
how.21 
                                                                                                                           
 
12 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/ 
outer_space (last visited Nov. 16, 2016). 
13 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 11, preamble. 
14 Id. at art. II. 
15 Adolph, supra note 7, at 963. 
16 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 11, at arts. III, IV. 
17 Id. at art. V. 
18 Id. at arts. VI, VII, VIII. 
19 Id. at art. VI. 
20 Id. at art. XI. 
21 Id. at art. XIV. 
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B. The Rescue Agreement 
The Rescue Agreement mainly concerns the protocol to be followed if 
a spacecraft must make an emergency or unexpected landing in a place 
outside of the jurisdiction of the “launching authority.”22 If this occurs, the 
Treaty signatories are obligated to “immediately take all possible steps to 
rescue [astronauts] and render them all necessary assistance.”23 Discovery of 
an emergency regarding the detection of space personnel in a precarious 
situation requires worldwide notification in order to render adequate 
assistance to the launching State and its citizens.24 Additionally, the treaty 
includes the procedures to be followed by signatories in returning space 
objects to the launching authorities.25 
C. The Liability Convention 
The Liability Convention establishes absolute liability for a launching 
authority that causes damage to the surface of the Earth or an aircraft that is 
in-flight and requires a State to pay damages.26 This responsibility attaches 
to the State regardless of whether the government or a person/body, subject 
to the jurisdiction of that State, caused the damage.27 The Convention sets 
forth the methods by which liability is apportioned among multiple states 
when more than one body is responsible for any resulting damages.28 Finally, 
the document requires the establishment of a Claims Commission in order to 
settle compensation issues when traditional diplomatic channels will not 
suffice.29 
                                                                                                                           
 
22 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space art. 6, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570 [hereinafter Rescue Agreement]. 
23 Id. at art. 2. 
24 Id. at art. 1. 
25 Id. at art. 5. 
26 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects art. II, Mar. 29, 
1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389 [hereinafter Liability Convention]. 
27 Id. at art. V. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at arts. XIV, XV. 
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D. The Registration Agreement 
The Registration Agreement, established in 1975, requires its 
signatories to record all objects launched into space, by their jurisdiction, 
with the United Nations Secretary-General. These recordings must be made 
under the presumption that a “mandatory system of registering objects 
launched into outer space would, in particular, assist in their identification 
and would contribute to the application and development of international law 
governing the exploration and use of outer space.”30 The Agreement asks for 
details such as launching State(s), date and location of launch, name or other 
identifying information of the space object, and general purpose of the 
object’s launch.31 
E. The Moon Treaty 
The Moon Treaty, signed in 1979, repeats many of the ideas articulated 
in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.32 The first, second, and third articles of the 
Moon Treaty state: International law applies to the activities of space, the 
“Moon and other celestial bodies” are for peaceful purposes only, and the 
exploration of space is to be for the benefit of all mankind.33 In furtherance 
of the common heritage doctrine, Article XI states that “neither the surface 
nor the subsurface of the moon . . . shall become property of any State, 
international intergovernmental or non-governmental organization, national 
organization or non-governmental entity or of any natural person.”34 The 
only authorized use (and, to some degree, ownership) of substances found on 
or in the moon applies only to those that are “necessary” to support scientific 
investigation.35 Under Article VII, any “areas of the moon having special 
scientific interest” must be reported.36 The Moon Treaty also calls for 
                                                                                                                           
 
30 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space preamble, Jan. 14, 1975, 28 
U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15. 
31 Id. at art. IV. 
32 Allen Duane Webber, Extraterrestrial Law on the Final Frontier: A Regime to Govern the 
Development of Celestial Body Resources, 71 GEO. L.J. 1427, 1434–35 n.60 (1983). 
33 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies arts. I, II, 
III, Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon Treaty]. 
34 Id. at art. XI. 
35 Id. at art. VI. 
36 Id. at art. VII. 
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signatories to notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the 
other signatories of “any phenomena [discovered] in outer space . . . which 
could endanger human life or health, as well as any indication of organic 
life.”37 
III. CRITICISMS OF CONTEMPORARY SPACE LAW 
Many legal scholars have criticized space law. Their criticisms have 
attacked problems within the Treaties as well as the circumstances left 
unaddressed by the United Nations. 
A. Failure of the Common Heritage Doctrine 
The most serious criticism of the Treaties has been of the Common 
Heritage Doctrine (or res communis), which runs throughout all five of the 
agreements. The Common Heritage Doctrine calls for the equal use of space; 
John Adolph, Esquire, as a student, explained the contention as follows: 
The philosophy of common ownership (res communis), while admirable in 
ideology, is primarily a doctrine of cooperation best left to science fiction. The 
doctrine clings to the notion seen in such films as Star Trek where humans share 
the resources of space in common, “developing and exploring space for the sheer 
joy of the information obtained.” Common heritage ignores “the realities of our 
ultra-competitive capitalistic global society where some corporations enjoy large 
annual revenues than the gross national product of many small countries.”38 
In other words, Common Heritage is seen by most as an impossible, though 
good-natured, theory of development in the modern age. 
Other legal thinkers have criticized the doctrine for being “unclear.”39 
The lack of a precise definition of Common Heritage has resulted in widely 
divergent interpretations of its meaning.40 Developing countries (i.e. those 
states which likely lack the resources—financially and educationally—to 
explore and develop outer space) argue that the Treaties declare the celestial 
                                                                                                                           
 
37 Id. at art. V. 
38 Adolph, supra note 7, at 979 (quoting Heidi Keefe, Making the Final Frontier Feasible: A 
Critical Look at the Current Body of Outer Space Law, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 
345, 347 (1995)). 
39 Webber, supra note 32, at 1436. 
40 Id. 
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bodies as common property for all on Earth in order to allow for the 
redistribution of “wealth and technology among nations.”41 The United 
States, by contrast, purports that Common Heritage made the exploration and 
development of space open to all who have the means and desire to reach for 
the stars.42 Without a common meaning, the doctrine serves more as a 
conveniently malleable political ideology than a governing principle of 
international law.43 
The Law of the Sea Treaty (hereinafter LOST)—a United Nations 
agreement governing the Earth’s common waters—also contains the 
Common Heritage Doctrine.44 An interpretation of the doctrine was provided 
in LOST: “[A]ll nations are entitled to share in the profits derived from 
seabed resources, regardless of their contribution of capital or technology to 
the extraction of those resources.”45 This definition is in line with the opinion 
of developing nations regarding space. Because a United Nations treaty has 
already defined the doctrine, it is likely that the Common Heritage Doctrine 
will assume this meaning in relation to the other treaties that the body has 
promulgated.46 Although, it is argued that the Treaties—the Moon Treaty, in 
particular—may not assume this meaning because “article XI expressly 
states that the common heritage of mankind ‘finds its expression in the 
provisions of this Agreement.’”47 
Without a clear definition of the doctrine, a period of colonialism in 
space could result because of differing, self-serving interpretations of 
common heritage.48 If the nations cannot agree on the interpretation of the 
doctrine (or, conversely, the more powerful developed nations disagree with 
the outcome of the decision come to by the more numerous but less powerful 
developing nations), the agreements would become little more than words on 
paper making the Treaties wholly ineffective.49 
                                                                                                                           
 
41 Id. at 1436–37. 
42 Id. at 1437. 
43 Id. at 1438. See also Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Science, Technology, and Space of the Senate Comm. 
On Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 96th Cong. 37 (1980) (statement of Dr. Robert A. Frosch, 
Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration). 
44 Webber, supra note 32, at 1438–39. 
45 Id. at 1439. 
46 Id. at 1440. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 1442–43. 
49 Id. at 1443. 
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The failure of the Treaties to articulate the meaning of the Common 
Heritage Doctrine, coupled with the potential failures of the doctrine’s own 
premise, call into question the ability of the Treaties to effectively regulate 
the development of space in the modern era. 
B. Failure to Address Property Rights 
Because the Treaties and the signatories lack a universal definition of 
the Doctrine of Common Heritage, there is not an understanding of what (or 
if) property rights exist in outer space. What is known, however, is that 
neither the Outer Space Treaty nor the Moon Agreement—the two most 
prominent space treaties—ban the private ownership of land or resources in 
space: “Rather, the two treaties resist private ownership and appropriation, 
and even that resistance is not absolute. . . . [T]he two treaties do permit the 
private ownership and appropriation necessary to commercialize space so 
long as international interests are given their due consideration.”50 
Not all agree with this proposition; some have argued that, although the 
treaties have not specifically barred private property rights, the use of broad 
language was intended to do just that. Those criticizing the literalists have 
looked to the treaties’ negotiating history, which supports a reading that bars 
ownership of property and resources in outer space.51 
However, some entities have ignored these interpretations. In fact, 
businesses have made profits by selling “lunar land documents.”52 
LunarLand.com, the “Earth’s oldest, most recognized celestial real estate 
agency,” explained their right to convey as follows: 
The UN Outer Space Treaty of 1967 stipulates that no government can own 
extraterrestrial property. However, it neglects to mention individuals and 
corporations. Therefore, under laws dating back to early US settlers, it is possible 
to stake a claim for land that has been surveyed by registering with the US Office 
of Claim Registries.53 
                                                                                                                           
 
50 Zach Meyer, Comment, Private Commercialization of Space in an International Regime: A 
Proposal for a Space District, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 241, 250 (2010). 
51 Keefe, supra note 38, at 358–59. 
52 LUNARLAND.COM, http://www.lunarland.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2016). 
53 About Us, LUNARLAND.COM, http://www.lunarland.com/about-us (last visited Nov. 22, 2016). 
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Interestingly, LunarLand.com appears to use the property law of the United 
States as its basis to sell deeds to land on the moon, Venus, Mercury, and 
Mars.54 
Despite the entrepreneurial spirit of some, commenters have warned of 
the discouraging effect the Treaties, at least as they currently stand, may have 
on the commercial and technological development of space.55 “Ownership 
and sovereignty accomplish similar purposes in the modern world. They 
provide a sense of security. . . . [W]here chaos reigns, investors and new 
settlers are not likely to follow.”56 
C. Global Climate Post-Cold War 
The Treaties were promulgated during the Cold War. The language of 
the Treaties “reflects the geopolitical climate at the time.”57 Between 1967 
and 1979, the United States and the Soviet Union were the primary players 
in the “space race.”58 At the time of drafting, the U.S. and the USSR were 
essentially the only signatories with the ability to leave Earth’s atmosphere.59 
This influenced the manner in which the Treaties addressed the use of space 
(e.g., emphasizing equal opportunity, banning militarization of space). Given 
the lack of discussion referring to both private and commercial ownership 
(and use) of space, it is clear that a non-governmental use of space was not 
an issue of high concern.60 
D. The Reality of the Modern Economy 
Commenters argue that the Treaties have created a legal moratorium on 
space exploitation.61 Because the Moon Treaty calls for the establishment of 
an “international regime” prior to any “exploitation of the natural resources 
                                                                                                                           
 
54 Gift Packages, LUNARLAND.COM, http://www.lunarland.com/gift-packages.html (last visited 
Aug. 20, 2017). 
55 Keefe, supra note 38, at 361. 
56 Id. 
57 Adolph, supra note 7, at 966. 
58 Id. 
59 Steven Freeland, Up, Up and . . . Back: The Emergence of Space Tourism and Its Impact on the 
International Law of Outer Space, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (2005). 
60 Id. at 5. 
61 Webber, supra note 32, at 1443–47. 
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of the moon” and other celestial bodies,62 it has been suggested that a de facto 
moratorium has been imposed, if a legal moratorium has not.63 
The repercussions of an outer space moratorium are similar to those 
mentioned above: Private enterprise would be discouraged from investing in 
space exploitation for fear of being forced to share profits amongst all the 
signatories of the Treaties.64 
Although the Treaties may discourage private investors and 
corporations from entering the space market, it is possible that such entities 
are willing to assume the risk of breaching the Treaties in order to capitalize 
on this untapped resource. Because only States are addressed in the Treaties 
and only States have signed the Treaties, private bodies have an argument 
and an incentive to ignore any moratorium that may have been placed upon 
space exploration. If this is true, which—based on the work of companies 
like SpaceX (Space Exploration Technologies Corporation)65 and Virgin 
Galactic66—it appears that it very well might be, the primary concern of our 
newest race for space will no longer be a lack of investment in space 
technology and research, but rather a lack of regulation, which is dangerous 
and contrary to the Treaties’ stated purpose. 
IV. PROPOSED REVISIONS TO CONTEMPORARY SPACE LAW 
A. Amend the Treaties 
Based on the criticisms mentioned above, it is fairly easy to predict the 
amendments that scholars have suggested for the Treaties. First, a 
clarification of the definition of the Common Heritage doctrine is crucial. It 
is possible that the Treaties themselves should be revised to include a 
definition that suits developed nations, developing nations, and private 
entities. Alternatively, the Treaties could remain as they are and allow “a 
refined understanding of ‘common heritage’ . . . [to] develop over time and 
in response to current events . . . . The product of that refinement process will 
                                                                                                                           
 
62 Moon Treaty, supra note 33, at art. XI. 
63 Webber, supra note 32, at 1445. 
64 Id. at 1445. 
65 SPACEX, http://www.spacex.com/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2016). 
66 VIRGIN GALACTIC, http://www.virgingalactic.com (last visited Nov. 28, 2016). 
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probably be a ‘lowest common denominator’ of the many definitions of 
‘common heritage of mankind’ . . . .”67 One author argues that the Common 
Heritage Doctrine should be abandoned entirely in favor of a new framework 
of discovery-based rights.68 
Regardless of the form the resolution of the Common Heritage Doctrine 
takes, the Treaties must address the existence of property rights outside of 
Earth’s bounds. Addressing the ways in which states as well as private 
entities may (or may not) interact with space may be the best manner in which 
to complete this revision. 
Less controversially, the Treaties require administrative amendments. 
Increased use of space necessitates the creation of a dispute resolution body 
with jurisdictional bases to use it in addition to procedural rules. The process 
of dispute resolution will be just as important as the person(s) or body who 
fulfills the need. 
Any amendments to the space Treaties should include a description of 
the “purpose” of space. Today’s newest space race seems to be happening, 
without the desired assurance of permission to obtain and retain space in 
space; thus, the United Nations may want to consider what purpose(s) space 
should serve for humankind: research and exploration (like the Treaties 
currently seem to support), a source of commercial resources for life (e.g., 
water, minerals), a new place for humans to live and work, etc. 
There are some people, however, who believe that the Treaties are no 
longer useful to the Earth’s relationship with space and should be terminated, 
instead favoring a “free-market approach” to property rights in space.69 
B. Implement Terra Nullius 
“That which belongs to no one can be lawfully appropriated by 
anyone.”70 It was the philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, like John Locke, who opined that, under terra nullius (or res 
                                                                                                                           
 
67 John S. Lewis & Christopher F. Lewis, Essay, A Proposed International Legal Regime for the 
Era of Private Commercial Utilization of Space, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 745, 757 (2005). 
68 Jonathan Thomas, Note, Privatization of Space Ventures: Proposing a Proven Regulatory Theory 
for Future Extraterrestrial Appropriation, 1 BYU INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 191, 195 (2005). 
69 Id. at 218. 
70 Karin Mickelson, The Maps of International Law: Perceptions of Nature in the Classification of 
Territory, 27 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L. 621, 623 (2014). 
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nullius),71 “land belongs to no one, until someone has mixed his or her labor 
with it.”72 Terra Nullius, coupled with Acquisition by Discovery, was the 
way in which Europeans laid claim to the lands of North America.73 This 
process began by issuing a charter for a person or persons to claim land on 
behalf of the granting state. To prevent wars (between European states), the 
countries agreed “discovery gave title to the government by whose . . . 
authority it was made, against all other European governments, which title 
might be consummated by possession.”74 
This doctrine is argued for use today because it “rewards the states and 
entities who are willing and able to take the risks and hardships” in 
developing outer space.75 As proposed, it would function, as follows: 
[I]f company A seeks to place a hotel on Mars, then company A would be required 
to seek a charter from a state. When company A discovers the extraterrestrial 
region upon its arrival, it would claim the territory in the name of the granting 
state. The state would then own the extraterrestrial region in fee; and pursuant to 
its charter, the state would convey its interest, in fee or term of years, to company 
A in full or portion thereof. Company A would perform its exploitation activities 
(hostelry) pursuant to the guidelines of the charter and be subject to the power of 
the granting state.76 
However, this proposal is not without complications. Commenters fear 
charter shopping: private persons or entities will “shop” for a charter with the 
greatest benefit for the lowest cost.77 This, of course, would incentivize states 
to create lower costs, including lowering the amount of regulation a state 
requires on its claimed lands—on safety or environment. In order to prevent 
charter shopping, it has been suggested that developed nations could “coerce 
developing states into multilateral and bilateral agreements that protect the 
environment and ensure safety procedures.”78 Such coercion could take the 
form of threats to stop aid or loans or threats to levy trade sanctions.79 This 
would make it possible, theoretically, for less wealthy nations to participate 
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in the development of space—including benefiting from taxes. “Instead of 
receiving indirect funds under the common heritage, developing states will 
become active participants in a market economy based upon the posturing of 
their contracts. Developing states would not be required to invest heavily in 
aerospace technologies because juridical persons would bring those 
technologies to the developing states.”80 
However, this will lead to a new problem with old roots: Taxation 
without representation.81 For example, a commercial entity or private person 
from state A stakes a claim on the Moon for state B and, therefore, must pay 
taxes to, abide by the laws of, and resolve issues within that state’s judicial 
system. However, the entity or person lacks the ability to exercise a voice in 
state B’s government, assuming state B has a democracy or representative 
democracy. 
But allowing states to individually control the use of space may result 
in large-scale problems beyond international discord over unclear language, 
such as irreversible environmental damage or violence between states 
regarding claims to resources. 
C. Establish New Regulatory Body 
One potential solution, proposed by many different authors, is to create 
a new regulatory body, separate from the United Nations, to regulate the use 
of space. Each commentator’s proposal has varied slightly. 
One author suggested the creation of a non-governmental organization 
“governed by an autonomous panel of individuals, not dominated or 
controlled by any nationalistic entities.”82 Similarly, a “space district,” an 
independent body unconnected to sovereign states, was proposed.83 Another 
space law contributor suggests that one country’s national law will emerge 
as the standard for space law or, if this is undesirable, then to simply allow 
the space industry to form standards and rules informally.84 Another scholar 
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presented the idea of an “International Space Condominium”—“an auction 
method of allocating user rights” to space where “[t]he condominium could 
lease or sell the rights to use these resources for limited or unlimited periods 
of time to the highest bidder. . . . Revenues, net of operating expenses, could 
be distributed to the shareholders, which initially might be national 
governments.”85 
These proposed bodies, and more, were suggested (at least in part) to 
avoid the involvement of the United Nations in the regulation of outer space. 
V. PURPOSE AND ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
The United Nations was founded in 1945 to maintain international peace 
and security, protect human rights, deliver humanitarian aid, promote 
sustainable development, and uphold international law.86 The UN is an 
international organization made up of 193 members (i.e. nation-states).87 
Membership is a process beginning with a State submitting an application to 
the UN Secretary-General, nine of the fifteen affirmative votes of the 
Security Council members (so long as none of the five permanent members 
vote negatively), and 2/3 of the members of the UN General Assembly vote 
for the admission of the applying State.88 
The UN is composed of six main bodies; the three most prominent of 
them are the UN General Assembly, UN Security Council, and the 
International Court of Justice.89 The General Assembly is made up of all 193 
members of the UN.90 Each member is given one vote in policymaking.91 The 
Security Council exists to maintain international peace and security.92 Each 
member of the Security Council (five permanent members and ten rotating 
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members) is entitled to one vote.93 The permanent members of the Security 
Council—China, Russia, France, United Kingdom, and United States—also 
have the powerful ability to veto.94 The International Court of Justice is the 
judicial arm of the United Nations.95 The International Court of Justice may 
hear claims between States who have consented to its jurisdiction or provide 
advisory opinions on issues submitted to the court by other UN organs.96 
Apart from the main organs, the UN also has committees that specialize 
in one area that the United Nations does work. For example, COPUOS was 
established in 1959 to “govern the exploration and use of space for the benefit 
of all humanity: for peace, security and development.”97 COPUOS created 
treaties and principles governing contemporary space law and meets annually 
to discuss advancements in technology and politics regarding outer space.98 
VI. THE UNITED NATIONS’ AUTHORITY TO REGULATE SPACE 
Article 1 of the United Nations Charter states: “The Purposes of the 
United Nations are: . . . [t]o achieve international co-operation in solving 
international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian 
character . . . and to be a centre for harmonizing the action of nations in the 
attainment of these common ends.”99 The broad language in the UN’s 
founding instrument is general enough to include the power to create and 
implement space regulations—as the exploration and exploitation of space 
could ensure the continued persistence of the human race either on Earth, in 
the united nations of the world—by harvesting (and selling) resources from 
space, or by finding a new home for humankind. But permissive language in 
an organization’s founding instrument does not cause it to be the proper body 
for the job. 
Many scholars have argued that the COPUOS Treaties are not effective 
governing documents for governing outer space. Several of these scholars, as 
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mentioned in the section above, have asserted that the United Nations should 
no longer be the producer and regulator of space law.100 
These academics posit that the UN is “institutionally weak and lacks the 
ability to enforce its own mandates.”101 To this effect, the UN is reliant upon 
its member states to implement plans and punishments. Additionally, the 
punishments that the UN is capable of enforcing can only be directed at States 
themselves, who would either have to take responsibility for the penalty or 
later punish private entities, if they are to blame for the violation(s). 
However, this all presupposes that the UN adds specific punishments and 
enforcement methods to the Treaties. 
The UN has also been criticized as a cumbersome and slow-moving 
organization.102 Critics fear that issues and conflicts will not be able to be 
addressed or resolved quickly enough.103 This concern is amplified because 
of the ever-advancing technology and the expansive nature of space. 
The UN is built upon “harmonizing” national interests in order to reach 
common goals.104 However, this is arguably “inconsistent with the principle 
[in the Treaties] that space should be developed for the benefit of mankind, 
and not for the benefit of nations.”105 Considering that capitalism is not a 
system built to benefit all of mankind (at least equally), the fear that the UN 
will be unable to attract and instill confidence in investors and developers is 
particularly relevant.106 
These criticisms are valid concerns of the United Nations’ lack of 
qualifications to shape and control space law; however, they overlook certain 
critical ineptitudes of the UN. One such factor is its lack of complete global 
representation. 
The UN has 193 member states.107 This number, although close, does 
not encompass all the countries of the world. There are sovereign states (as 
well as several states whose sovereignty is uncertain) that do not have a say 
in the decision-making process regarding the universe that embraces their 
home planet. This is especially problematic because the permanent members 
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of the UN Security Council have (at times) two votes (one in the General 
Assembly and one in the Security Council) in addition to the power to veto 
certain propositions. This fact could be particularly problematic because 
some of the space powers have permanent Security Council seats, leaving 
perhaps too much room for nationalistic interests and, once again, ignoring 
the Common Heritage Doctrine. Even if the Common Heritage Doctrine 
were to be set aside, permitting nations like the U.S. and Russia to ultimately 
control the rules of space would almost certainly undermine hopes of global 
representativeness. 
Furthermore, the UN is an intergovernmental organization composed of 
diplomats—people informed of the state of the nations they represent and the 
nations they interact with. These representatives are not experts on outer 
space or technology, though; they almost certainly do not understand the 
complexities of space travel that scientists and mathematicians have spent 
careers grappling to comprehend.108 
With all of the limitations of the UN as an entity aside, the issue of 
regulation outside of Earth’s bounds still remains. The UN, inevitably, will 
base its regulations on principles of law known and accepted on Earth.109 This 
is not necessarily problematic, but the very nature of space—its expansive, 
ever changing landscape—makes it difficult to implement effective laws in 
advance.110 However, is it enough to say that because to date we have found 
no other life, within a very limited distance from Earth, that (with the United 
Nations’ permission) humans may begin the process of colonization in outer 
space? Is it enough to justify implementing a rule of law, that’s somewhat 
functional in places on this planet and only maybe functional elsewhere, on 
the entirety of the universe that humankind can reach? But, on the other hand, 
are problematic laws enough to keep humans from, at best, locating new life 
and, at worst, locating valuable, life-saving resources? 
The permissibility, much less the desirability, of the United Nations 
regulating space is a concern that all nations (within and without the UN) 
should be discussing in conjunction with the relative risks, rewards, and 
ultimate fairness of capitalizing on space. 
                                                                                                                           
 
108 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/ 
outer_space (last visited Nov. 16, 2016). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
2017] SAVING SPACE WITH UN-AUTHORIZED ACTS 75 
 
Vol. 36, No. 1 (2017) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2017.129 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
VII. TRAITS OF AN IDEAL SPACE GOVERNING BODY 
Concurrent with their criticisms of the UN, academics have provided 
traits that an ideal body to govern space would encompass. The following are 
consistently suggested traits that, collectively, could work to overcome the 
negatives associated with the UN and its approach to space law. 
Like the UN, an ideal space organization should be international in 
nature and open to all nations (not only UN members or nations with space 
programs). However, experts in space and technology who are free from 
nationalistic loyalties should lead the group.111 Some authors have suggested 
limiting the group’s jurisdiction to the development and exploitation of 
resources on celestial bodies as these, unlike the ability to travel, for example, 
are finite.112 
In order to maintain the organization as well as to continue advancing 
the field, a tax might be levied on those entities that use celestial body 
resources.113 One scholar argued that participants in the development of 
space should have a larger say than non-participants in the rule of law 
governing said development.114 This would be unnecessary, however, if a 
charter system was in place, which would allow all nations to participate in 
the claiming of resources in space.115 Regardless of the system, a public 
claims registry should be established to keep track of who owns or occupies 
what and where for the purposes of enforceability.116 In case of disputes, 
there must be a dispute resolution system in place.117 Finally, nations need to 
establish domestic regulations relating to space to fill in the gaps of 
international space law and prevent charter shopping.118 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the UN has made strides in beginning the process of using 
space to the benefit of all mankind. Indeed, the five Treaties remain the only 
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authoritative law on space today. Despite the progress that the UN has made, 
the intergovernmental body leaves much to be desired. So much, in fact, that 
many feel that an entirely new organization should be established to regulate 
tomorrow’s entrance to space. 
Earth’s utilization of space is not a reverie but a reality. To fully, fairly, 
and safely maximize the benefits of outer space, countries must begin to plan 
for a future outside of our earthly bounds. 
